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SPECIAL	  ISSUE	  OF	  GRAZER	  PHILOSOPHISCHE	  STUDIEN	  90,	  2014.	  	  THE	  SECOND-­‐PERSON	  STANDPOINT	  IN	  LAW	  AND	  MORALITY	  	  	  	  EDITORIAL	  Christoph	  Hanisch	  and	  Herlinde	  Pauer-­‐Studer	  	  The	  papers	  of	  this	  special	  issue	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  two-­‐day	  conference	  entitled	  “The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  in	  Law	  and	  Morality,”	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Vienna	  in	  March	  2013	  and	  was	  organized	  by	  the	  ERC	  Advanced	  Research	  Grant	  “Distortions	  of	  Normativity.”	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  conference	  was	  to	  explore	  and	  discuss	  Stephen	  Darwall’s	  innovative	  and	  influential	  second-­‐personal	  account	  of	  foundational	  moral	  concepts	  such	  as	  „obligation“,	  „responsibility“,	  and	  „rights“,	  as	  developed	  in	  his	  book	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint:	  
Morality,	  Respect,	  and	  Accountability	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  2006)	  and	  further	  elaborated	  in	  Morality,	  Authority	  and	  Law:	  Essays	  in	  Second-­‐Personal	  Ethics	  I	  and	  Honor,	  
History,	  and	  Relationships:	  Essays	  in	  Second-­‐Personal	  Ethics	  II	  (both	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2013).	  	  	  With	  the	  second-­‐person	  standpoint	  Darwall	  refers	  to	  the	  unique	  conceptual	  normative	  
space	  that	  practical	  deliberators	  and	  agents	  occupy	  when	  they	  address	  claims	  and	  
demands	  to	  one	  another	  (and	  to	  themselves).	  The	  very	  first	  sentence	  of	  Darwall’s	  examination	  of	  the	  second-­‐personal	  conceptual	  paradigm	  summarizes	  the	  gist	  of	  the	  argument	  succinctly	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  “the	  second-­‐person	  standpoint	  [is]	  the	  perspective	  that	  you	  and	  I	  take	  up	  when	  we	  make	  and	  acknowledge	  claims	  on	  one	  another’s	  conduct	  and	  will.”	  (Darwall	  2006,	  3)	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  reminds	  us	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that	  this	  perspective	  has	  been	  ignored	  for	  much	  too	  long	  and	  that	  it	  better	  take	  centre	  stage	  in	  any	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  moral	  phenomena,	  in	  order	  to	  yield	  a	  satisfying	  account	  of	  morality	  as	  a	  social	  institution.	  The	  negative	  part	  of	  Darwall’s	  strategy	  is	  to	  show	  that	  neither	  a	  purely	  first-­‐personal	  approach	  (represented	  by	  Kant	  and	  contemporary	  Kantians),	  nor	  a	  third-­‐personal	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs-­‐perspective	  (represented	  by	  most	  varieties	  of	  contemporary	  consequentialism)	  are	  capable	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  categorical	  bindingness	  characteristic	  of	  moral	  obligation.	  The	  latter	  feat	  can	  only	  be	  accomplished,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  positive	  part	  of	  Darwall’s	  argument,	  when	  those	  second-­‐personal	  normative	  “felicity	  conditions”	  and	  conceptual	  presuppositions	  are	  acknowledged	  and	  spelled	  out	  that	  are	  already	  presupposed	  in	  every	  instance	  of	  issuing	  (putatively	  valid)	  claims	  and	  demands.	  It	  is	  especially	  second-­‐personal	  competence	  and	  second-­‐personal	  authority	  that	  are	  the	  bedrock	  of	  these	  normative	  conceptual	  presuppositions,	  without	  which	  engaging	  in	  any	  meaningful	  address	  would	  be	  impossible.	  Kantians	  and	  utilitarians	  alike	  have	  neglected	  this	  critical	  dimension	  of	  the	  normative	  landscape.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  working	  out	  an	  original	  conception	  of	  moral	  obligation,	  the	  first	  eight	  chapters	  of	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  articulate	  this	  fundamental	  insight	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  traditional	  projects	  in	  ethical	  theory	  such	  as	  developing	  accounts	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  rights,	  dignity,	  and	  autonomy.	  In	  this	  context,	  special	  emphasis	  is	  to	  be	  awarded,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  Darwall’s	  refreshing	  second-­‐personal	  interpretation	  of	  Strawson’s	  influential	  account	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  to	  his	  historically	  well-­‐informed	  reconstruction	  of	  Samuel	  Pufendorf’s	  often	  neglected	  version	  of	  an	  enlightened	  theistic	  voluntarism	  concerning	  moral	  authority.	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Darwall	  dedicates	  the	  second	  part	  of	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  to	  the	  urgent	  question:	  how	  should	  one	  respond	  to	  the	  sceptical	  challenge	  that	  expresses	  utter	  indifference	  to	  the	  second-­‐person	  standpoint,	  including	  all	  its	  multifarious	  normative	  presuppositions	  and	  implications?	  What	  commits	  us	  to	  all	  this?	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  that	  Darwall,	  firstly,	  refines	  his	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Kantian,	  first-­‐personal,	  paradigm	  of	  normativity	  and	  emphasizes	  that	  only	  if	  one	  already	  incorporates	  the	  second-­‐personal	  conceptual	  apparatus	  into	  a	  Kantian	  analysis	  of	  moral	  obligation	  is	  the	  latter	  going	  to	  yield	  a	  convincing	  account.	  Secondly,	  and	  this	  certainly	  is	  one	  of	  the	  highlights	  of	  Darwall’s	  theory,	  the	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint	  employs	  themes	  from	  Fichte’s	  philosophy	  of	  right	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  case	  for	  the	  inescapability	  of	  taking	  up	  the	  second-­‐person	  standpoint	  of	  moral	  obligation.	  In	  his	  contribution	  for	  this	  special	  issue	  Darwall	  further	  develops	  his	  diagnosis	  that	  Fichte’s	  thought	  offers	  in	  many	  respects	  a	  more	  promising,	  since	  more	  second-­‐personal,	  foundation	  of	  morality	  than,	  for	  example,	  Kant’s.	  	   	  By	  now,	  the	  impact	  of	  Darwall’s	  second-­‐person	  standpoint	  theory	  has	  far	  transcended	  the	  confines	  of	  contemporary	  debates	  on	  moral	  obligation.	  Darwall	  has	  put	  to	  use	  the	  second-­‐personal	  apparatus	  to	  critical	  engagements	  with	  Joseph	  Raz’s	  theory	  of	  legal	  authority	  and	  Derek	  Parfit’s	  convergence	  arguments	  for	  his	  recent	  Triple	  Theory	  of	  moral	  wrongness.	  The	  constant	  theme	  that	  unifies	  all	  these	  diverse	  applications	  remains	  the	  one	  so	  impressively	  presented	  in	  The	  Second-­‐Person	  Standpoint:	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  “interdefinable”	  and	  “irreducible”	  circle	  of	  (four)	  foundational	  second-­‐personal	  concepts	  (valid	  demand,	  practical	  authority,	  second-­‐personal	  reason,	  and	  accountability),	  neither	  superior	  epistemic	  status	  (Raz)	  nor	  the	  identification	  of	  optimific	  states	  of	  affairs	  (Parfit)	  are	  potent	  enough	  sources	  to	  generate	  anything	  close	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to	  the	  authority	  relationships	  that	  underlie	  the	  idea	  involved	  in	  obligating	  ourselves	  and	  one	  another.	  Given	  all	  of	  the	  above,	  it	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  Darwall	  reserves	  his	  strongest	  sympathies	  for	  a	  specific	  ethical	  theory,	  namely	  contractualism.	  Our	  commitment	  to	  equal	  basic	  second-­‐personal	  authority,	  that	  Darwall	  arrives	  at	  through	  his	  Fichtean	  rectification	  of	  the	  Kantian	  project,	  leads	  him	  to	  the	  endorsement	  of	  a	  contractualist	  paradigm	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  broadly	  Rawls	  and	  Scanlon.	  	  	  	  
